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INTRODUCTION
Martin Skhreli, the “Pharma Bro” and former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuti-
cals, outraged the American public when he raised the price of Daraprim—an 
HIV drug with no alternative treatment—from $13 to $750 per pill.1 Lost in the 
outrage over Skhreli’s conduct is the fact that he was a small-time operator in 
an industry that exhibits far more egregious examples of dangerous and socially 
irresponsible behavior. The pharmaceutical industry is the most profitable in the 
world because drug company executives persuade Americans to consume huge 
quantities of prescription drugs that they do not need.2 The average American 
* Eugene McCarthy is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Illinois, 
Springfield. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., UCLA School of Law. Thank you to 
Riaz Tejani and Shara Murphy for their invaluable commentary.
1. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 
20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-
price-raises-protests.html.
2. See Liyan Chen, The Most Profitable Industries in 2016, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2015, 4:19 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/12/21/the-most-profitable-industries-in-2016/
#6e3fc99c5716; see also Rolando Y. Wee, Biggest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World by Coun-
try, WORLDATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-biggest-global-
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takes 13 distinct prescription drugs a year;3 yet, since the 1970s, American life 
expectancies have fallen well behind those in other developed nations.4 Our use, 
overuse, and misuse of prescription drugs contribute to this alarming trend. Pre-
scription drug overdoses are the leading cause of accidental death in the United 
States.5 Adverse reactions to pharmaceutical drugs are the fourth leading cause 
of American hospital deaths.6 The prescription opioid crisis kills 50 Americans 
every day while producing $55 billion in annual social costs.7 It is revealing that 
prescription drugs designed to treat the adverse side effects of other prescription 
drugs are among the fastest growing pharmaceutical markets.8 Indeed, many of 
the drugs that doctors prescribe do little if anything to improve public health 
and are both dangerous and ineffective.9 Prescription drugs exist to generate 
corporate revenue. As a leading industry observer puts it, “we are quite literally 
taking pills to save the lives of companies who have a greater interest in the vi-
tality of the diseases they market than in our well-being.”10 Paradoxically, our 
prescription medicines are making us sick.
In this Article, I argue that drug companies have created a highly profitable 
but dangerous business model by employing the same legal tactics as the nine-
teenth-century “robber barons,” the group of financiers who orchestrated corpo-
rate law’s infamous race to the bottom. Like these historical financiers, drug 
company executives have captured the legal apparatus and regulatory bodies 
that oversee them. In so doing, they have transformed the law from a system of 
governance into a set of enabling doctrines. The pharmaceutical industry has 
turned legislation intended to protect the public into a legal justification for 
marketing ineffective and unsafe prescription drugs. Like the nineteenth-century 
robber barons who transformed American corporate law into a tool for maxim-
izing wealth and limiting liability, modern-day “pharma barons” have corrupted 
pharmaceutical-markets-in-the-world.html (stating that the pharmaceutical industry is a major sector 
in the world economy) (last updated Apr. 25, 2017).
3. JOSEPH DUMIT, DRUGS FOR LIFE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES DEFINE OUR 
HEALTH 2 (2012).
4. DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON 6 (2012).
5. Robert Parker Tricarico, A Nation in the Throes of Addiction: Why a National Prescrip-
tion Drug Monitoring Program is Needed Before it is Too Late, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 117, 123 
(2015).
6. Donald W. Light et al., Institutional Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe 
and Effective Drugs, 41 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 590, 593 (2013).
7. Howard G. Birnbaum, et al., Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, 
and Misuse in the United States, 12 PAIN MED. 657, 657 (2011); Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, 
The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Rever-
sal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 9 (2017).
8. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 85.
9. Paul Jorgensen, Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Agenda, 14 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 561, 562 (2013).
10. HEALY, supra note 4, at 10.
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the laws that govern the pharmaceutical industry. The law now operates in the 
service of the pharma barons and allows them to profit at the public’s expense.
This Article has three key components. First, it examines corporate law’s 
notorious nineteenth-century race to the bottom. The race to the bottom is the 
phenomenon through which financiers like Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and 
J.P. Morgan encouraged states to offer increasingly lax corporate laws in ex-
change for new revenue streams. In this race, many states (e.g., New Jersey and 
Delaware) revised their corporate codes in order to enable corporations rather 
than police them. These legal changes produced great corporate wealth but lit-
tle, if any, liability for corporate malfeasance.
Second, the Article turns to the pharmaceutical industry and demonstrates 
that several factors have produced a contemporary race to the bottom in the pre-
scription drug industry. Drug companies have transformed government-
mandated clinical trials meant to prove a drug’s safety and efficacy into a sys-
tem of “evidence-based medicine” aimed at deceiving both doctors and the pub-
lic. The drug companies employ biased clinical trials and ghostwritten medical 
journal articles to create a dangerous illusion of safe and effective pharmaceuti-
cal drugs. These rigged clinical trials—coupled with the recent deregulation of 
prescription drug advertising—enable drug companies to market misleading 
“evidence” about their prescription drugs. Companies market these drugs 
through controversial (and singular to the United States) direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising campaigns to drum up awareness of previously unrecognized symp-
toms and diseases. Legal deregulation also permits drug companies to engage in 
private, in-person “detailing” of doctors in an effort to persuade them to pre-
scribe drugs to patients for untested and unapproved uses that often prove det-
rimental—and deadly. The pharmaceutical industry lobby, the nation’s most 
powerful over the last two decades, ensures that this new race to the bottom 
proceeds unimpeded.
Finally, the argument concludes with an examination of the pharma barons
who developed and marketed the prescription drugs Vioxx, Paxil, and OxyCon-
tin. Collectively, the adverse side effects of these three drugs have resulted in 
the hundreds of thousands of American deaths.11 The drug company executives 
who fraudulently marketed these deadly drugs have faced little, if any, criminal 
liability for their actions. Indeed, they have become extremely wealthy just as 
Gould, Carnegie, and Morgan did a century before them. While corporate law’s
original race to the bottom had beneficial outcomes that included innovative fi-
nancial instruments and new and efficient economies of scale, the same cannot 
be said for the contemporary race to the bottom.12 Legal changes in the pharma-
ceutical industry have stunted scientific research and innovation while endan-
gering American public health.
11. Davis & Carr, supra note 7, at 9.
12. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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I. THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM AND THE RISE OF THE ROBBER BARONS
The late nineteenth century saw the rise of larger-than-life financiers who 
aggregated then-unheard-of levels of wealth, often at the expense of the general 
public. This era, defined in part by its opulence and disparity in wealth between 
the social elite and the rest of the population, spawned a new kind of business 
person. Jay Gould, the crafty railroad and telegraph tycoon, accumulated the 
equivalent of $58.2 billion in today’s currency.13 Andrew Carnegie, the steel 
magnate, amassed the equivalent of $281 billion.14 J.P. Morgan, the first mod-
ern investment banker, earned a relatively modest $1.2 billion, but did so by 
manipulating the entire United States economy for the sake of his powerful cli-
ents.15 These ruthless financiers, whom historians dub the “robber barons,”
achieved this level of wealth (and, we will see, legal impunity for their actions) 
in large part due to corporate law’s so-called race to the bottom.
This section maps corporate law’s race to the bottom, whereby the law 
shifted from constraining corporate actors to enabling their pursuit of wealth by 
easing and sometimes even erasing corporate regulations. These enabling laws 
fall into two categories: (1) affirmative legislation that paved the way for great-
er corporate freedoms and (2) regulations that appeared to constrain corporate 
actions but ultimately came to serve corporate interests. The race to the bottom 
is the byproduct of several U.S. states competing with one another and “racing”
to attract corporate revenue by offering attractive corporate laws within their 
jurisdictions. The robber barons and industry leaders catalyzed the race to the 
bottom and blurred the lines between government and industry, or through what 
J. Willard Hurst calls the phenomenon of legal “default and drift”—that is, the 
purposeful imbrication of government and industry concentrated unprecedented 
public policy decision making in private hands.16 As a result, public policy 
came to serve private interests.
A. Revising the Corporate Codes
In its earliest days, American corporate law looked like its conservative 
English ancestor: incorporation was a rare and special privilege that the legisla-
ture granted, and the corporation was a “creature of the state,” bound by strin-




15. Chase Peterson-Withorn, From Rockefeller to Ford, See Forbes’ 1918 Ranking of The 
Richest People In America, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
chasewithorn/2017/09/19/the-first-forbes-list-see-who-the-richest-americans-were-in-1918/
#5f9de1ab4c0d.
16. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 78 (1956).
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gent legal requirements enunciated in its corporate charter.17 These initial cor-
porate charters (the legal documents that bring a corporation into existence and 
define its capacities) established a number of mandatory rules for the corpora-
tion and drastically restricted corporate powers.18 For instance, most pre-Civil 
War corporate charters limited the type of business in which a corporation could 
engage.19 Any ultra vires corporate actions (those exceeding the powers granted 
in the charter) would be void.20 The ultra vires doctrine not only limited what a 
corporation could do, but also dictated what kind (and what amount) of property 
it could own in conducting its business.21 These charters likewise restricted the 
corporation’s size, life span, financial resources, territorial boundaries, and held 
shareholders to “double liability,” meaning they had to pay twice their invest-
ment amount upon corporate liquidation or dissolution.22 Early American cor-
porate law also expressly denied one corporation the right to own shares in an-
other corporation, preventing the creation of corporate subsidiaries and holding 
companies.23 In short, corporations were relatively small business operations 
subject to strict government regulation.
This would all change when corporate law initiated its infamous race to the 
bottom and began to enable rather than regulate corporate action. The historical 
starting line for the race to the bottom is debatable, but a reasonable hypothesis 
marks its beginning at the Civil War and the subsequent ascendance of the Re-
publican Party’s pro-industrial political platform.24 Civil War financing gener-
ated the first investment bankers and a public market for securities (the trading 
of government war bonds), two of the driving forces behind corporate law’s ear-
ly evolution.25 After the war, the nation continued to expand westward at a rap-
17. See P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 237, 246–47 (2010).
18. Id.
19. STEPHEN A. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW 30 (2d ed. 2015).
20. Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions,
42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 184–89 (1936).
21. 1889 N.J. Laws 414. These changes in New Jersey corporate law indicate that the type of 
property that a corporation could own and use was very much at the core of delineated corporate 
capacities in the late nineteenth century.
22. Vasudev, supra note 17, at 246.
23. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780–1970 69 (1970).
24. See 2 CHARLES A. & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 52 (1927)
(describing the Civil War as the “Second American Revolution,” that ended in the capitalist co-
opting of the political system); see also HURST, supra note 23, at 140; MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE 
ROBBER BARONS 51 (1932) (noting that Lincoln, whether he realized it or not, “hastened miracu-
lously a transfer of power to the emergent groups of large-scale capitalism”); CHARLES R. MORRIS,
THE TYCOONS: HOW ANDREW CARNEGIE, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD, AND J.P. MORGAN 
INVENTED THE AMERICAN SUPERECONOMY 10 (2005) (noting that “[o]nce in office, and freed from
Southern obstructionism after the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln and his Republican majority un-
leashed a blitz of predevelopment legislation without parallel in American History.”).
25. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 11 (2011).
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id rate, and the corporation emerged as the primary “instrument for mustering 
and disciplining large amounts of capital and allowing dependable continuity 
for its use.”26 The corporation’s ability to accumulate private capital through 
shareholder investment and then to use that capital to perform quasi-public 
functions (e.g., build a transcontinental railroad, provide a city with water, etc.) 
enticed the government to sweeten the deal for incorporators from both a legal 
and financial perspective.27 Federal and state governments granted corporations 
great leeway because they were doing the government’s job for it.28 The gov-
ernment evaluated corporate utility so highly that it warranted the use of law to 
give “businessmen a free hand in adapting the corporate instrument to their own 
will” and determined that the function of corporate law was to “enable busi-
nessmen to act, not police their action.”29 In the blink of an eye, the race to the
bottom was off and running.
States subsequently began to eliminate restrictions on corporations in their 
respective corporate codes.30 These states sought revenue from in-state corpora-
tions while business promoters sought jurisdictions with less stringent corporate 
restrictions.31 This alignment of interests produced symbiotic combinations of 
state legislatures and corporate lawyers who worked together to re-draft more 
lenient and attractive corporate laws.32 The next big surge in the race to the bot-
tom occurred when New Jersey—the “Mother of Corporations” or, alternative-
ly, the “Traitor State”—decided to openly court corporations in order to maxim-
ize this newfound revenue-generating potential.33 In 1875, New Jersey amended 
its constitution to abolish legislatively granted special corporate charters, usher-
ing in an era of so-called “general incorporation.”34 Under the special charter 
system, state legislatures issued a sparing number of charters to incorporators 
based on a system of political patronage.35 In order to generate a larger stream 
of corporate revenue, New Jersey’s law of general incorporation allowed any-
body to incorporate in the state of New Jersey so long as they filed an incorpo-
ration fee, obeyed simple corporate formalities, and—most importantly—paid 
26. HURST, supra note 23, at 34.
27. See id. at 62.
28. See HURST, supra note 16, at 65.
29. Id. at 13, 71.
30. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, at 30.
31. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 664 (1974).
32. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 194 (1985).
33. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the 
Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 323, 337 (2007).
34. Id. at 331.
35. Id. at 332.
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an annual franchise tax to the state.36 Businesses flocked to New Jersey, and the 
state quickly became the most popular venue for legal incorporation.37
New Jersey emerged as the most attractive state for corporations because a 
small group of corporate lawyers effectively wrote the state’s corporate statutes 
to serve the needs of their clients.38 The goal was to create as much legal protec-
tion and economic opportunity as possible for corporate executives and direc-
tors. Corporate lawyers from the industry subject to proposed regulation drafted 
the legislative bills ostensibly aimed at curbing their corporate powers.39 After 
the 1875 move to general incorporation, New Jersey continued its methodical 
program of loosening corporate law restrictions. In 1889, the legislature passed 
a statute that allowed one corporation to purchase and own stock in another cor-
poration, even if that corporation was incorporated in a state other than New 
Jersey.40 This law allowed one corporation to act as a massive holding company 
with a corporate structure that included various subsidiary corporations on a na-
tionwide scale. It also allowed a corporation to purchase another corporation’s 
assets and to use its own stock, to which it could assign any value, as considera-
tion for the asset purchase.41 This wrinkle enabled “cash-strapped promoters” to 
purchase another corporation’s valuable assets with what might ultimately 
amount to worthless stock (the risk was on the seller of the assets, who be-
lieved—with good reason and from practical experience—that the stock would 
one day be as valuable as advertised when the holding company was finally re-
organized and began oligarchical price fixing within its industry).42
New Jersey again revised its laws in 1896 to eliminate the ultra vires doc-
trine and to remove limitations on a corporation’s size, lifespan, and business 
activities.43 Single corporate entities like Standard Oil could now grow to domi-
nate an entire industry, which only increased their wealth and political clout. 
The 1896 Act also allowed New Jersey corporations to issue different classes of 
stock with varying powers and shareholder voting rights.44 This new power en-
abled corporations to issue non-voting stock, whose primary purpose was to 
function as an asset to be traded on a capital exchange market, thus encouraging 
investment for purely speculative purposes. Shareholders became speculators; 
as speculators, these shareholding “owners” of the corporation became geo-
graphically scattered and largely disinterested in the corporation’s day-to-day 
36. Id. at 330.
37. Id. at 327.
38. Id. at 336; see also Horwitz, supra note 32, at 194.
39. GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916 95 (1965).
40. 1889 N.J. Laws 414.
41. Yablon, supra note 33, at 341.
42. Id. at 343.
43. 1896 N.J. Laws 279–80.
44. Yablon, supra note 33, at 352.
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business operations.45 If the stock price rose (no matter the reason), they were 
content. This left those in control of the corporation—corporate managers and 
directors—in a position to use the corporation for self-dealing and self-
enrichment so long as they could inflate the stock price, whether through legit-
imate or artificial means.46
Because corporate managers decided where to incorporate, New Jersey and 
other states that participated in the race to the bottom (in particular, Wyoming, 
Maine, West Virginia, and Delaware) tailored laws to suit management interests 
rather than shareholder interests.47 In the event that shareholders sought to dis-
cipline or punish the corporation or its officers and directors, they found it diffi-
cult to pierce the corporate veil to reach key investors, individual directors, or 
the financiers acting through the corporate body. In 1891, the Supreme Court 
reinforced these increasingly permissive state corporate laws when it validated 
the doctrine known as the business judgment rule.48 According to the business 
judgment rule, directors (at that time, usually composed of the promoting finan-
ciers and their intimates) were not liable for mistakes of judgment with regard 
to corporate actions, even if they were “so gross as to appear to us absurd and 
ridiculous.”49 As a result, directors and executives could justify all sorts of self-
serving decisions by couching them as mere mistakes in “business judgment.”
These deregulations allowed corporate agents to be the buyer and seller in 
the same corporate transaction, fleecing both corporations while personally en-
riching themselves as a third-party beneficiary.50 Likewise, late-nineteenth cen-
tury corporate law did not prohibit insider trading (trading in securities while in 
possession of material nonpublic information).51 Financiers used “bear” tactics 
such as rumors of new competition or decreased dividends to drive stock prices 
down in order to purchase large blocks of stock. They would follow with “bull”
tactics (rumors of large dividends or new acquisitions) to quickly elevate the 
stock price so that they might sell to the public at enormous personal profit.52
This cycle of buying and selling stock at prices that the financier manipulated 
was potentially endless. The corporate laws permitted other low-risk and high-
reward financial maneuvers, as well. Financiers and their corporations could 
issue corporate bonds to the public to finance some large enterprise (e.g., build-
45. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 251 (1932).
46. Id. Berle and Means were, famously, among the first to identify this “agency problem”
with regard to the emerging separation of corporate ownership and control.
47. See generally, Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1443 (1992).
48. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165–66 (1891).
49. Spering’s Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872).
50. WHITE, supra note 25, at 199.
51. The federal prohibition arose in Strong v. Repide 213 U.S. 419 (1909); see also STEPHEN
A. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 519–24 (2002).
52. See MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 96 (1986).
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ing a bridge, a railroad, etc.).53 They would then loot the capital raised through 
these bonds by using a construction or service corporation that they also con-
trolled.54 Indeed, in many cases the primary corporate enterprise was created 
simply so financiers could plunder that corporation’s publicly raised capital via 
subsidiary service and construction corporations.55
The race to bottom even turned legislation that was meant to curtail corpo-
rations into tools that increased corporate power. Take, for instance, the Sher-
man Antitrust Act of 1890.56 The Sherman Act was designed to prevent monop-
olistic business trusts by making illegal “every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States or with foreign nations.”57 Federal judges unabashedly 
turned this piece of antimonopoly legislation against the very organizations it 
was designed to protect—labor unions. In the first seven years of the Sherman 
Act, federal courts found thirteen antitrust violations, twelve of which involved 
labor union “conspiracies” in restraint of trade.58 In other words, when labor 
organizations rose up against corporate monopolies, the government turned an-
timonopoly legislation against the labor unions to help reinforce the very corpo-
rate monopolies the Sherman Act was meant to eliminate. The race to the bot-
tom subverted all meaningful attempts to regulate nineteenth-century 
corporations and transformed corporate law into a tool that aided and abetted 
corporate actors.
B.  The Emergence of Nineteenth-Century Lobbying
This race to the bottom was made possible by a blurring of the line between 
industry and government. This occurred in two forms: through lobbying of state 
and federal legislatures and the emergence of a revolving door between the pub-
lic and private sectors. James Willard Hurst observes that one of the most im-
pactful legal changes to occur in the nineteenth century was the emergent power 
of special interest groups—or lobbies.59 Indeed, legal historians have noted that 
the emergence of lobbying in nineteenth-century America transformed politics 
into “a realm of economic competition between corporations,” whereby lobby-
ists who were often “ex-politicians, helped to move legislation and thus avoid 
gridlock, but at a price.”60 In one such instance of lobbying for favorable legis-
lation, Oakes Ames—a member of Congress and an officer of the Union Pacific 
53. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 92–93.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 92.
56. Sherman Act, 26 Sat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004)).
57. Id. at § 1.
58. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 919, 950 (1988).
59. See HURST, supra note 16, at 101.
60. WHITE, supra note 25, at 103.
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Railroad—distributed stock related to his railroad interests to other members of 
Congress. The result was congressmen receiving stock in “a corporation they 
had chartered, one they had to supervise, and which repeatedly came before 
them for legislation.”61 It is no wonder recipients of the stock payments routine-
ly favored railroad interests in their legislative efforts. Collis Huntington of the 
Central Pacific Railroad once lamented that he would have to pay $200,000 to 
get a particular bill passed through Congress—a price he felt was too steep giv-
en his previous payouts.62 And this was a small sum, all things considered. A 
railway commission investigation regarding $5 million of unaccounted-for 
money on the books of the Central Pacific Railroad determined “there is no 
room for doubt that a large portion of this money was used for the purposes of 
influencing legislation and of preventing the passage of measures deemed to be 
hostile to the interests of the company, and for the purpose of influencing elec-
tions.”63 Lobbying—or outright bribery—played a large part in securing legisla-
tion (and legislatures) that contributed to corporate law’s race to the bottom.
A revolving door between the government and private industry also facili-
tated corporate law’s deregulatory decline. During the race to the bottom, an 
individual could have a job in private industry while also holding public office. 
The muckraker David Graham Phillips demonstrates this fact through the ex-
ample of U.S. Senator Chauncey Depew.64 During his tenure as a senator, De-
pew, in addition to serving as a director on over 70 corporate boards, represent-
ed the New York Central Railroad corporation as its general counsel.65 Such 
conflicts of interest were commonplace throughout the government. While serv-
ing as U.S. Attorney General, Richard Olney also worked as counsel for the 
Burlington railroad and repeatedly used his political position to secure govern-
ment injunctions to prevent railroad strikes that were adverse to his private in-
terests.66 On the advice of railroad corporation attorneys, Attorney General 
Olney persuaded President Cleveland to send federal troops—over the governor 
of Illinois’ loud objections—to break the Pullman Strike, which was endanger-
ing corporate railroad revenues.67 Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin wrote 
and passed legislation on March 12, 1886, that granted major land interests to 
the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railroad corporation in his 
home state.68 On March 16, 1886, he represented the same railroad as its lawyer 
before the Supreme Court and successfully defended the railroad’s land acquisi-
tion, which he had just orchestrated as Senator.69 Historian Gabriel Kolko notes 
61. Id. at 65.
62. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 24, at 84.
63. WHITE, supra note 25, at 129–30.
64. DAVID GRAHAM PHILLIPS, THE TREASON OF THE SENATE 64–75 (1964).
65. Id. at 63.
66. WHITE, supra note 25, at 385.
67. Id. at 442.
68. PHILLIPS, supra note 64, at 119.
69. Id.
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that “more likely than not, the average railroad president in the 1870s had a 
background in politics—over half held some political job before or during their 
careers as railroad presidents.”70 These blurred boundaries between the public 
and private sectors negated the government’s regulatory capacity to curtail the 
power and interests of wealthy financiers and their corporate interests.
C. The Robber Barons
Three financier “robber barons” help shed light on the type of corporate 
transactions that the race to the bottom made possible: Jay Gould, Andrew Car-
negie, and J.P. Morgan. These three businessmen used corporate law as both a 
sword and a shield in amassing great fortune. They exploited intercorporate 
stock ownership—looting corporations via self-dealing service contracts—and 
industry-side collusion through interlocking directorates that the race to the bot-
tom made possible. They each engaged in illegal and antisocial behavior that 
harmed the public but faced no criminal liability for their actions.
Jay Gould used the stealth and guile that New Jersey’s corporate code revi-
sions made possible in amassing his fortune. A contemporary of Gould de-
scribed him as “the worst man on earth since the beginning of the Christian era. 
He is treacherous, false, cowardly, and a despicable worm incapable of a gener-
ous nature.”71 Recent biographies suggest that Gould, also known as the Mephi-
stopheles of Wall Street, probably was not quite as bad as his contemporaries 
suggested, but he was certainly a crafty man. Gould mastered the financial 
world by cultivating “the art of controlling huge enterprises with minimal hold-
ings, utilizing not only equity control but funded debt, the proxy market, float-
ing debt, contractual flaws, receiverships, and especially legal technicalities.”72
In his earliest ventures as a surveyor and tannery manager, he sought to explore 
opportunities and engage in behavior that quickly taught his business partners 
that he had no intention of conforming to traditional business norms. In one in-
stance, Gould armed his employees and had them take over a tannery from 
which one of his business partners attempted to exclude him.73 In other instanc-
es, he openly bribed legislators, bought judges, betrayed business partners, and 
in the case of the Erie Wars, actually “stole” the Erie Railway Company (well, 
its stocks and ledgers) and rushed it across the state border from New York to 
New Jersey to evade arrest.74 His escape to New Jersey was successful, and all 
criminal charges were eventually dismissed after Gould reincorporated in the 
“Traitor State” and made the proper “political contributions” back in Albany.75
When faced with the threat of state or financial discipline, Gould’s response 
70. KOLKO, supra note 39, at 15.
71. KLEIN, supra note 52, at 3.
72. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 59.
74. Id. at 83 (describing the situation as “the novel spectacle of a corporation in exile”).
75. Id. at 84.
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was inevitably “ingenious, strikingly original, unexpected, technically legal, and 
ethically dubious.”76 One might well apply these same five descriptors to the 
race to the bottom more generally.
Two of Gould’s related financial transactions demonstrate his business in-
genuity. In 1874, Gould controlled the Union Pacific Railroad corporation.77
Due to his insider position, he knew that the corporation would soon have to 
redeem government bonds at great expense to the corporate treasury, which 
would depress the stock price.78 As such, he quietly sold most of his interest in 
the corporation and used the profits to buy into other railroad companies.79 He 
secretly began buying smaller, regional railroad corporations such as the Kansas 
Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and the Wabash.80 He scattered his stock ownership 
across a wide field to veil his intentions.81 His holdings “were too diverse and 
sprawling for anyone to know where the heart of his system lay.”82 At the same 
time, using several newspapers he owned, Gould attacked out of nowhere West-
ern Union’s monopoly over the telegraph industry.83 As public sentiment 
against Western Union grew, its stock price fell.84 Gould began purchasing 
Western Union stock as he facilitated a bear market for its shares.85 He also 
took control of a defunct telegraph corporation, the Atlantic & Pacific, and rein-
corporated it as the American Union.86 He then illegally interfered with Western 
Union’s contracts to arrange contracts between his new regional railroads and 
the recently acquired American Union telegraph corporation—and got away 
with it.87
Gould subsequently stepped down from the Union Pacific board of directors 
and threatened to combine his regional railroads into a national system to com-
pete directly with Union Pacific.88 Facing “ruinous competition” from Gould’s
new railroad network, Union Pacific was compelled to buy Gould’s railroad 
system for $6.7 million.89 Meanwhile, Western Union faced “ruinous” competi-
tion from Gould’s American Union telegraph corporation.90 Western Union 
proposed a merger with American Union, and upon the merger Gould became 
76. Id. at 330.
77. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 136.
78. Id. at 138.
79. Id. at 144.
80. Id. at 142–44.
81. Id. at 143.
82. KLEIN, supra note 52, at 249.
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the majority shareholder of the Western Union corporation. He immediately en-
tered into a lucrative contract on behalf of Western Union with Union Pacific to 
provide telegraph services. Essentially, Gould shifted from ownership and con-
trol of Union Pacific to ownership and control of Western Union, using differ-
ent corporate bodies and underhanded tactics to make the shift possible and to 
extract huge sums of capital from both entities along the way. His secretive tac-
tics “enabled him to roam freely, a dealer in the unexpected. It was impossible 
for others to know what he actually controlled, let alone discover his intentions. 
He was the consummate one-eyed jack, an enigma, a phantasmagoria.”91 All the 
while he illegally invalidated contracts, used corporate attorneys to issue and 
cancel injunctions, and orchestrated judicial rulings that perfectly met his needs. 
For these reasons, to his rivals, “Gould would remain an image spread to infini-
ty across a hall of mirrors.”92 These enigmatic business powers arose from the 
deregulation of business and the new corporate laws that encouraged such fi-
nancial gambits. The stock-for-asset purchases and the new corporate structures 
that the race to the bottom produced enabled Gould to “spread himself to infini-
ty” through various industries.
Andrew Carnegie used fewer moving pieces than Gould in amassing his 
fortune. Instead, he operated as an obstinate, self-interested, and monolithic fig-
ure in a single field: the steel industry. He succeeded by hedging his invest-
ments and ensuring that his enterprise took on as little risk as possible through 
legally sanctioned corporate looting and self-dealing. Carnegie was always 
looking for a way to climb the corporate ladder, starting as a telegraph operator 
at the Pennsylvania Railroad corporation and ending as the owner of the mono-
lithic Carnegie Steel Company, which he sold in 1901 for nearly $500 million.93
He entered into countless enterprises with a small financial stake, “bouncing 
from flower to flower,” until he saw a “good opportunity to scale up—
reorganizing, reenergizing, and recapitalizing—almost always emerging as the 
lead shareholder.”94 One of his earlier deals, the St. Louis Bridge project, is il-
lustrative of his financial self-dealing and business acumen. He financed the op-
eration by issuing bonds through the St. Louis Bridge Company (which he 
owned) and selling those bonds to the public.95 The Keystone Bridge Company, 
which Carnegie also owned, carried out the construction on behalf of the St. 
Louis Bridge Company.96 The St. Louis Bridge Company paid Keystone with 
the funds it generated from selling its bonds to the public.97 The Keystone 
Bridge Company purchased its supplies from the Union Iron Mills, which Car-
91. Id. at 254.
92. Id. at 421.
93. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE 
RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 84 (1990).
94. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 91–92.
95. Id. at 92.
96. Id. at 93.
97. Id.
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negie, likewise, owned.98 For good measure, the St. Louis Bridge Company 
employed the one and only Andrew Carnegie, at a huge fee, as its investment 
banker to place its bonds and sell them to investors.99 The bridge opened in 
1874 and the St. Louis Bridge Company quickly settled its accounts with Key-
stone (i.e., Carnegie), Union Iron Mills (i.e., Carnegie), and with Carnegie as 
investment banker.100 The bridge company went bankrupt within the year, leav-
ing the bondholders high and dry, but leaving Carnegie with a small fortune 
from the various construction and financial services he supplied (Jay Gould, in-
cidentally, purchased the bridge for a song and used it as leverage in his Union 
Pacific transactions).101
Carnegie justified his dubious business dealings, quite simply, by “lying—
egregiously, consistently, and continually.”102 Indeed, his biographers suggest 
that he was one of the most prolific liars in American history. This same im-
moral mendacity accompanied Carnegie’s war profiteering, where he escaped 
legal punishment for Carnegie Steel’s supplying faulty steel plates to the U.S. 
Navy. A government investigation substantiated one of his disgruntled employ-
ee’s claims that Carnegie knowingly supplied faulty steel armor and falsified 
the results of ballistic tests to the government, but the investigation could not 
determine precisely who within the corporation had lied or plugged holes in the 
armor plates.103 The government imposed a fine on the corporation (not Carne-
gie individually), in the amount of $150,000—or ten percent of the transaction 
cost.104 Carnegie retained his lucrative government contracts to supply steel to 
the navy after the investigation, notwithstanding the scandal.
J.P. Morgan did not have to hustle as much as either Gould or Carnegie to 
attain the status of robber baron. Morgan’s father, Junius Spencer Morgan, was 
one of the nation’s leading bankers and established Morgan in the family busi-
ness. Morgan acted as banker and fiscal agent for the leading corporations in 
most major American industries, and he held large blocks of stock in the corpo-
rations he represented.105 He exercised “direct, secret authority” over these cor-
porations by strategically influencing each of the companies’ boards of direc-
tors.106 A congressional investigation later revealed that Morgan’s infamous 
system of “interlocking directorates” held 341 directorships in 112 separate 
corporations.107 These interlocking directorates allowed Morgan to engage in 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 93.
100. Id. at 93–94.
101. Id. at 94.
102. Id. at 16.
103. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 24, at 391–92.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 313.
106. Id.
107. DAVID A. ZIMMERMAN, PANIC! MARKETS, CRISES, & CROWDS IN AMERICAN FICTION
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unprecedented self-dealing between corporations and to exert undue influence 
over the economy more generally. Louis Brandeis described Morgan’s vast 
economic influence in the following terms:
J.P. Morgan (or a partner), a director of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford 
Railroad, causes the company to sell to J.P. Morgan & Co. an issue of bonds. J.P. 
Morgan & Co. borrow the money with which to pay the bonds from the Guaranty 
Trust Co., of which Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director. J.P. Morgan & Co. sell 
the bonds to the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of which Mr. Morgan (or a 
partner) is a director. The New Haven spends the proceeds of the bonds in purchas-
ing steel rails from the United States Steel Corporation, of which Mr. Morgan (or a 
partner) is a director. The United States Steel Company spends the proceeds of the 
rails in purchasing electrical supplies from the General Electric Company, of which 
Mr. Morgan (or a partner) is a director[.]108
Morgan controlled the markets to ensure that he and his clients came out 
ahead in each transaction. At one point, Morgan controlled a third of the na-
tion’s railroads and over two thirds of the steel industry through the U.S. Steel 
corporation (the largest portion of which, incidentally, he purchased from An-
drew Carnegie).109 In addition to an incident of war profiteering in which he 
knowingly financed the sale of defective weapons to American troops, Morgan 
remained committed to influencing legislation (via bribery) to amend state cor-
porate laws to serve his own interests.110
Morgan’s primary and oft-repeated goal was to end “ruinous competition”
by creating large corporate trusts to engage in price fixing and market control 
within each major industry.111 The sheer size of his interlocking directorates 
made it difficult to know which directors were serving Morgan’s interests and 
which were serving the corporation’s interests. This industry-wide (or even na-
tionwide) control was on display during the Panic of 1907, a three-week bank-
ing crisis that resulted in the collapse of several banking and trust companies in 
New York. In the aftermath, credible accusations arose that Morgan helped or-
chestrate the Panic, enabling him to weed out his bank’s competitors and to 
overcome legal barriers against profitable, but forbidden, corporate mergers.112
This story probably sounds all-too familiar to students of the 2007 banking cri-
sis. Morgan agreed to help end the Panic on the condition that President Roose-
velt promise to refrain from applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to Morgan’s 
acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, which he long coveted 
but which would result in a monopolistic restraint on trade when joined with his 
U.S. Steel Corporation.113 Roosevelt agreed to allow the corporate merger and 
108. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 269.
109. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 107, at 154.
110. See CHERNOW, supra note 93, at 370. Morgan’s “preferred list” or bribe recipients (in 
the form of stock sales on a when-issued basis) shows the level of corruption the banker attained 
and how little he thought of the laws that governed his actions.
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the Panic ended soon thereafter.114 Morgan purchased Tennessee Coal and Iron 
during the Panic for $45 million; financial analysts at the time valued the com-
pany at close to $1 billion.115
As this section demonstrates, corporate law’s nineteenth-century race to the 
bottom enabled these robber barons to engage in complex, antisocial, and very 
profitable behavior free from meaningful regulation and personal liability. New 
Deal corporate and securities regulations would ultimately slow this race to the 
bottom in the 1930s but, as the next section demonstrates, a new deregulatory 
race is currently underway in the contemporary pharmaceutical industry.116
II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE NEW RACE TO THE BOTTOM
In 2011, the U.S. government accused Merck Pharmaceutical of intentional-
ly misbranding its pain-relieving drug Vioxx, which had adverse side effects 
that killed somewhere between 60,000 and 500,000 people via heart attack and 
stroke.117 Merck executives were aware of these deadly side effects and con-
cealed them from the FDA.118 Merck settled the charges by paying a criminal 
fine and no corporate executives faced criminal charges for their actions.119 In 
fact, the CEO who presided over Merck’s Vioxx decisions received a final cor-
porate compensation package of $37.8 million in 2005.120
The U.S. government accused Purdue Pharmaceutical of fraud and inten-
tionally misbranding its highly addictive opioid pain reliever OxyContin, which 
is the primary catalyst of the opioid epidemic and contributes to approximately 
50 prescription opioid overdose deaths in the U.S. every day.121 Purdue settled 
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115. Id.
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2010).
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the criminal charges by paying a series of criminal fines.122 The family who 
owns and controls the closely held corporation faced no legal repercussions for 
the corporation’s crimes and continues to reap annual profits of $700 million 
from the sale of OxyContin and possesses a familial net worth of $13 billion.123
GlaxoSmithKline paid a $3 billion criminal fine relating to government 
charges that it engaged in kickbacks and fraudulently marketed its drug Paxil.124
This fraud related to the company’s effort to convince doctors to prescribe Paxil 
to treat adolescent depression despite the fact that executives knew Paxil trig-
gered suicides in teenagers.125 In the same year that GlaxoSmithKline settled 
these charges with the government,  the company paid its CEO the equivalent of 
$14 million in executive compensation.126 As these fact patterns suggest, drug 
company executives represent the next generation of robber barons akin to Jay 
Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan. The pharma barons reap profits 
from engaging in socially irresponsible and illegal behavior and face no real li-
ability for their actions.
In this section, I demonstrate that the pharmaceutical industry is in the midst 
of a new legal race to bottom reminiscent of corporate law’s nineteenth-century 
race toward deregulation. Pharmaceutical executives have coordinated a deregu-
latory push that has enabled them to increase industry profits at the expense of 
public safety while avoiding personal criminal liability. This legal race to the 
bottom has three driving forces. First, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962
instituted the modern regime of “evidence based medicine,” which requires 
drug companies to conduct clinical trials to prove a new drug’s safety and effi-
cacy.127 Loopholes in these laws allow drug companies to use biased research 
and publication methods to create the illusion of safety and efficacy that hides 
122. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public 
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the fact that many new drugs are only minimally effective and have extremely 
dangerous side effects. Second, the drug companies have produced and exploit-
ed the deregulation of prescription drug advertising. Through direct-to-
consumer advertising and in-person “detailing” (or persuasion) of doctors, drug 
companies now channel their time and resources into marketing prescription 
drugs as opposed to scientific research and innovation. Many prescription drugs 
now exist to capture pre-existing markets through sophisticated advertising 
campaigns in order to generate corporate profit, not to cure sick patients. Final-
ly, the pharmaceutical industry utilizes the nation’s most extensive lobbying 
campaign (for twenty years running) and dangles lucrative job offers in front of 
federal officials to erode the boundaries between government and industry. As a 
result, the government agency tasked with regulating the pharmaceutical indus-
try—the Food and Drug Administration—now serves the industry rather than 
polices it.
A. Clinical Trials and the Rise of “Evidence-Based Medicine”
The government began regulating the pharmaceutical industry in 1906 with 
the Pure Food and Drug Act, which required drug manufacturers to provide la-
bels disclosing the drug’s therapeutic ingredients and prohibited the sale of mis-
branded drugs.128 Then, in response to a scandal where the drug sulfanilamide 
killed 106 people, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938 
(“FDCA”).129 FDCA, in turn, created the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) and required drug companies to seek FDA permission to market drugs 
in interstate commerce.130 In 1962, Congress responded to the tragic birth de-
fects caused by the anti-anxiety drug Thalidomide by passing the Kefauver-
Harris Amendments to the FDCA.131 The Kefauver-Harris Amendments re-
quired drug companies to conduct clinical trials to prove a new drug’s efficacy 
and safety and to disclose the drug’s adverse side effects.132 Drug companies 
assert that conducting the required research and clinical trials to secure FDA 
approval costs an average of $800 million for each new drug they develop.133
As this subsection demonstrates, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments and the 
high costs of research and development tempt drug companies to cheat in their 
clinical trials in order to gain approval for their new prescription drugs. First, 
drug companies engage in “clinical bias,” which is the process through which 
128. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 770.
129. Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 
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they rig the design of the trial to ensure that the new drug will appear both safe 
and effective.134 Then, to ensure that all the evidence points toward a safe and 
effective drug, the drug companies ghostwrite journal articles and pay leading 
specialists and doctors to sign their names as co-authors to lend credibility to 
the studies.135 If, despite these tactics, a drug company still cannot achieve a 
successful clinical trial to gain FDA approval, they petition the FDA to conduct 
a trial with “enriched enrollment protocols.”136 Enriched enrollment protocols 
allow the company to run a clinical trial with only patients who have, in an ear-
lier trial, responded well to the new drug and to exclude patients who had ad-
verse reactions to the drug in earlier tests.137 (In other words, the FDA allows 
companies to run clinical trials that are guaranteed to be successful.)
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments established a system through which a 
drug company can only gain FDA approval to sell a new drug if it demonstrates 
that the drug is both safe and effective.138 To prove this, drug companies engage 
in a long and arduous process of testing their new drugs. They must first identi-
fy a potential therapeutic use for the drug, and then begin testing the drug on 
animals to identify therapeutic or toxic effects.139 If the drug proves nontoxic, 
the drug company begins three phases of human testing.140 The first phase in-
volves toxicity and efficacy tests on a small group of human subjects, usually 
ranging between 20 and 80 patients.141 If the drug still appears safe and effec-
tive, drug companies begin phase two of their investigation, in which they ex-
pand the testing to a larger group of several hundred human subjects.142 Again, 
if the results are positive the company begins phase three testing, which in-
cludes controlled clinical trials that test the drug on thousands of human sub-
jects who suffer from the disease or ailment the drug is designed to treat.143
These clinical trials compare human subjects taking the experimental drug with 
a control group, who are taking either a placebo (a sugar pill) or an alternative 
therapy that has already received FDA approval to treat the disease in ques-
tion.144 These trials are typically “double blind” studies, in which neither the 
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patients nor the doctors know which person is taking the new drug or the place-
bo—this safety mechanism is in place to prevent bias on the part of the party 
conducting the trial.145 If the drug company believes it has conducted two suc-
cessful phase three trials that demonstrate “statistically significant” positive re-
sults over placebo or standard treatment, they may seek FDA approval to sell 
the drug.146 After the FDA approves the drug, the drug company can begin 
marketing and selling its treatment.
These theoretically strong safety precautions have proven to be anemic (or 
worse, dangerous) in actual practice. This paradoxical result arises because 
drug companies have complete control over the design and execution of their 
clinical trials. As such, they only report the “evidence” from the clinical trials 
that have favorable outcomes. This results in a phenomenon called “clinical bi-
as.” Marc Rodwin identifies clinical bias as the corruption that “lies at the root”
of the FDA approval process.147 He has noted that an “ample record reveals that 
drug firms can design clinical trials in ways that bias the conclusions” in their 
favor and then compound the problem because they routinely “misinterpret or 
misreport their trial data, or engage in fraud.”148 Adding to the potential for 
clinical bias is the fact that the FDA officially ignores failed clinical trials.149 A
drug company might conduct as many as 100 clinical trials, where 98 trials
show that the new drug is less safe and effective than a placebo or standard 
treatment while only two trials yielded positive results in favor of the new drug. 
The overwhelming bulk of the evidence in this scenario points to the new drug 
being more dangerous and less effective than a placebo or pre-existing treat-
ments, yet these two “successful” trials are sufficient to gain FDA approval for 
the drug.150 In other words, it is possible to gain FDA approval for a drug that 
clinical trials have proven to be ineffective or dangerous 98% of the time.
Drug companies likewise “hobble” the standard treatment against which 
they are testing their new drug. In order to obtain the results the drug company 
is seeking, the researcher running the trial administers the standard treatment 
“in the wrong dose by the wrong route.”151 That is, they administer the standard 
treatment against which they are testing at a dosage that they already know will 
be less effective or perhaps entirely ineffective. Under these rigged conditions, 
the new drug appears to outperform the standard treatment in the clinical trial. 
The doctors who engage in clinical bias do so, it is alleged, because drug com-
panies pour an estimated $24 billion a year into the clinical trial industry, which 
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accounts for the bulk of the annual funding these researchers receive.152 Critics 
of the clinical trial system describe it as “profoundly corrupting,” concluding 
that “it makes no sense for the pharmaceutical companies to be the only one de-
veloping the evidence. At present, those who have the most to gain by finding 
positive results in clinical trials are often the only source of information about 
their drugs.”153 Without independent third parties conducting the trials, it is im-
possible to know whether or not a researcher has strategically designed a clini-
cal trial to produce biased results in favor of the new drug’s safety and efficacy.
If simple clinical bias proves an insufficient tool for securing FDA approv-
al, drug companies have obtained an additional deregulatory shortcut with re-
gard to conducting clinical trials: so-called “enriched enrollment” protocols. 
Clinical trials that allow for an enriched enrollment protocol flip the FDA ap-
proval process on its head. Drug companies lobbied the FDA for enriched en-
rollment procedures because they could not conduct successful clinical trials in 
which opioid painkillers outperformed a placebo or standard treatments like 
Aspirin and Tylenol.154 Enriched enrollment allows a company to start a clinical 
trial without a control group, instead giving all the patients the new drug—in 
this case, the opioid painkillers. Patients who respond poorly to the opioids 
(typically half of the clinical trial participants) drop out of the study and the on-
ly subjects that remain in the study are the ones who respond well to opioids.155
At this point, the researchers assign a control group and give them a place-
bo, while the other half of the participants—who the researchers already know 
respond well to the opioids—continue to receive the opioid treatment.156 The 
subjects who receive the placebo, of course, undergo withdrawal from the high-
ly addictive opioids, and drop out of the study or report negative side effects 
(i.e., agonizing withdrawal symptoms) while those who already responded well 
to the opioid continue to do so. The result is a clinical trial that appears to 
demonstrate the efficacy of opioid painkillers in comparison to placebo, which 
in turn leads to FDA approval.157 Dr. Anna Lembke of Stanford Medical School 
concludes that “the enriched enrollment protocol does appear to be a way for 
drug companies to cheat, getting approval for opioid painkillers that don’t really 
work.”158 Industry observers have expressed deep concern over the “unsettling 
circularity” of clinical trials that utilize enriched enrollment protocols, but such 
protocols nonetheless persist.159
152. Rodwin, supra note 129, at 126.
153. Rennie, supra note 133, at 1010.




158. Id. at 68.
159. Jonah Campbell & Nicholas B. King, “Unsettling Circularity”: Clinical Trial Enrich-
ment and the Evidentiary Politics of Chronic Pain, 12 BIOSOC’YS 191, 205 (2017).
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Drug companies also engage in “publication bias” to create the appearance 
of scientific evidence that a new drug is safe and effective despite, in many cas-
es, clear evidence to the contrary. Most people are shocked to discover that 
there is a large (and entirely legitimate) “ghostwriting” industry in the field of 
scientific writing. Drug companies pay third-party professional authors to draft 
articles that portray their new drugs in a positive light—regardless of the find-
ings from the clinical trials—and then place those articles in prestigious medical 
journals.160 After the drug company and the ghostwriter produce a final draft of 
the article, they offer “thought leaders” and respected doctors tens of thousands 
of dollars to attach their names to the articles to give the “evidence” more cred-
ibility.161 This practice is so scandalous that it sounds like a conspiracy theory, 
but the editors of top medical journals have been trying to alert the public about 
this commonplace practice for years.162 Drummond Rennie, editor at the highly 
respected JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (“JAMA”), la-
ments that he and his colleagues have published
manuscripts that we editors received in good faith, only to discover, sometimes 
years later, that the “authors” had been anointed as such when everything but the 
final draft of the manuscript had been completed by the company, their sole func-
tion being to lend the scientific and institutional prestige to the trials, and make 
them credible to the profession.163
Indeed, a former drug company ghostwriter who participated in these 
schemes described her scientific writing on behalf of the pharmaceutical indus-
try as “marketing masquerading as science.”164
Sergio Sismondo explains that drug companies control every step of the 
publication process through a phenomenon he calls “ghost management.”165
Sismondo observes that “in extreme cases, drug companies pay for trials by 
contract research organizations (“CROs”), analyze the data in-house, have pro-
fessionals write manuscripts, ask academics to serve as authors of those manu-
scripts, and pay communication companies to shepherd them through publica-
tion in the best journals.”166 Publication bias works in the inverse, as well. Drug 
companies prevent researchers from publishing articles (sometimes through 
160. See, e.g., HEALY, supra note 4, at 83–84.
161. Rennie, supra note 133, at 998.
162. E.g., id. at 991–92 (“In various ways I and my fellow medical editors are seen as repre-
senting the establishment. So consider this. Indirectly, the issue of money’s influence on researchers 
and physicians has over the past two decades eased the departure of several of the editors in chief of 
our major medical journals. My colleagues, Jerome Kassirer and Marcia Angell, both of the NEJM, 
and Richard Smith, editor of the British Medical Journal, have all, the moment that they left their 
posts, written books bemoaning the appalling influence of pharmaceutical company money on the 
morals and practices of their profession.”).
163. Id. at 998.
164. KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 33.
165. Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped 
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429, 1429 (2007).
166. Id.
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overt threats and intimidation) about failed clinical trials that have proven a new 
drug to be ineffective or unsafe.167 This collective publication bias and ghost 
management creates a false appearance of drug safety and efficacy that deceives 
regulators, doctors, and patients alike. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments and 
the clinical trials they require have produced a paradoxical outcome: the proof 
that a drug works is based on evidence that the drug does not, in fact, work. In-
stead of protecting the public health, clinical trials function as a tool through 
which drug companies produce misleading evidence about the safety and effi-
cacy of their new drugs. Clinical trials and the scientific publications they pro-
duce, we will see, amount to little more than deceptive marketing tactics.
B. Contagious Advertising: The Primacy of Marketing over Research
The systematic legal deregulation of prescription drug advertising has 
caused drug companies to turn away from pharmaceutical innovation and to fo-
cus instead on marketing derivative “lifestyle” drugs. Lifestyle drugs target 
chronic, lifelong conditions that ensure patients will take the drug on a routine 
or daily basis for the rest of their lives.168 Drug companies focus on treatments 
for chronic conditions because cures are not profitable; once a patient is cured,
she no longer has to purchase the prescription medicine.169 Chronic treatments, 
on the other hand, are very profitable: in 2010 the global market for pharmaceu-
tical drugs approached $1 trillion, most of which stemmed from “chronic dis-
ease management” in the U.S.170
As this subsection demonstrates, the drug company focus on producing 
blockbuster treatments for chronic conditions has caused pharmaceutical re-
search and innovation to grind to a halt. It has also endangered public health by 
unnecessarily exposing patients to potentially unsafe medications. The grim fact 
that drug companies now spend more than twice as much money on advertising 
than they do on developing new drugs speaks to the primacy of marketing over 
167. Rodwin, supra note 129, at 129; see also David R. Culp & Isobel Berry, Merck and the 
Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 1, 27 (2007) (citing the exam-
ple of Gurkirpal Singh, a professor at Stanford University’s medical school, who “said that a Merck 
senior executive had contacted his superiors to warn that if Singh continued to express his concerns 
about Vioxx he would have career problems in the future.”).
168. See generally DUMIT, supra note 3 (examining the industry tactic of getting Americans 
hooked on prescription drugs for life out of fear of high blood pressure, high cholesterol, or other 
asymptomatic “risk factors”).
169. See, e.g., HEALY, supra note 4, at 50 (“Marshall made overtures to Glaxo but found they 
had no interest in a cure for ulcers. The beauty of H-2 blockers was that once they began taking 
them, many patients remained on them indefinitely. Actually eliminating ulcers, the treatment of 
which had just become the cash cow of the pharmaceutical industry, was not what Glaxo had in 
mind. The decade between the contrasting scientific experiments of James Black and Barry Mar-
shall had propelled medicine into a new world, one in which it could not be assumed that science 
and business were on the same side, as they had appeared to have been over the previous three dec-
ades.”).
170. Id. at 10.
52 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 8:29
research in the pharmaceutical industry.171 The Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) provided the deregulatory legal change 
that enabled the pharmaceutical industry to shift its focus from research to mar-
keting.172 After FDAMA, drug companies abandoned the quest for cures to in-
stead market the threat of disease and pre-disease “risk factors” to the public.173
First, FDAMA removed the ban on televised direct-to-consumer prescription 
drug advertising.174 As a result, drug companies are now able to “educate” con-
sumers and increase “public awareness” about a host of chronic diseases. Many 
of these “diseases” did not even exist until companies created drugs to treat 
them (e.g., restless leg syndrome, fibromyalgia, mitochondrial disorder).175
Second, FDAMA and subsequent litigation eased restrictions on direct in-
person advertising to doctors, or “detailing.”176 Detailing is when a drug com-
pany representative meets with a doctor to inform her about off-label (non-FDA 
approved) treatments for which she might conceivably prescribe the drug.177
Doctors maintain the legal right to prescribe any drug they choose, even if the 
FDA has not approved a drug to treat a particular condition.178 Persuading a 
doctor to write off-label prescriptions bypasses the time-consuming and expen-
sive FDA approval process and helps the drug company to create substantially 
larger markets for the sale of prescription drugs. It also makes patients unwit-
ting subjects of untested experimental treatments that often have dire conse-
quences.
The quasi-legal standard to maximize shareholder value has enabled drug 
companies to seek out larger markets and to develop “blockbuster drugs”—
drugs that achieve annual sales in excess of $1 billion.179 Ironically, research 
171. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label Promo-
tion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 696 (2014).
172. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2296 (1997).
173. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 206.
174. Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availabil-
ity, 62 FED. REG. 43171, 43172 (Aug. 12, 1997); see also Food and Drug Administration Moderni-
zation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
175. KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 34.
176. Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amend-
ment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2014).
177. Id. See also Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(discussing the FDMA’s provisions regarding information dissemination).
178. See Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate 
Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 654–56 (2013).
179. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 90. For the quasi-legal standard to maximize shareholder value, 
see Eugene McCarthy, Ralph Clare, Fictions Inc.: The Corporation in Postmodern Fiction, Film, 
and Popular Culture, 13 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 173, 175 (2017). In challenging this quasi-
legal standard, McCarthy observes that “[t]he book repeatedly claims that corporations are legally 
bound to maximize profit (or, as corporate apologists say, to ‘maximize shareholder value’). This 
catchphrase is a myth that corporate actors perpetuate to rationalize unpopular executive decisions,
like downsizing and outsourcing. The business judgment rule, which gives management tremendous 
leeway in directing the corporation, makes clear that maximizing corporate profit is not an enforce-
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and development is not the key to producing a blockbuster drug. Drug compa-
nies instead copy pre-existing blockbuster drugs as closely as they can without 
infringing upon the patent. They then attempt to acquire the preexisting market 
through a sophisticated advertising campaign of their new “me-too” drug (i.e.,
our company makes an even better drug for that condition) that closely resem-
bles their competitor’s product.180 In his book-length study of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, Joseph Dumit describes this new industry logic in the following 
terms:
Once you take the perspective that what matters is not return to health but the 
growth of prescription sales, it is obvious that patients are valuable only to the ex-
tent they can afford to purchase treatments (or have treatments purchased for 
them). Often, research is directed . . . at me-too drugs, tiny variations on existing 
drugs with very little difference in efficacy that can nonetheless be patented and 
used to take over existing markets.181
In some instances, a company produces a “me-too” drug that copies its own
successful drug when its patent is set to expire. This trick, called “patent ever-
greening” or “product hopping,” is precisely what the drug company Astra-
Zeneca pulled off with its acid reflux drug Prilosec, or the “Purple Pill.”182 As 
Prilosec’s patent expiration date approached, AstraZeneca did not seek to de-
velop a better treatment, but instead patented a drug—called Nexium, or the 
“new purple pill”—that was in effect chemically identical to Prilosec.183 Astra-
Zeneca proved Nexium’s efficacy, not without controversy, by conducting a 
clinical trial against Prilosec in which they “hobbled” the soon-to-be off patent 
Prilosec’s dosage.184 The result of the product hopping: an extended 20-year pa-
tent period for what amounts to an identical drug produced by the same compa-
ny.185 Patented drugs, of course, cost much more money than generic, off-patent 
drugs.186
The manipulation of clinical guidelines is another deregulatory tactic the 
pharmaceutical industry employs to prioritize market growth over innovation. 
Clinical guidelines determine whether a person is “at risk” for a disease and 
should receive treatment, even if they exhibit no symptoms or negative health 
effects associated with the medical condition in question.187 Experts in a given 
able legal dictate. There is no ‘legal corporate directive’ to engage in antisocial corporate conduct.”
(citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1968)).
180. See DUMIT, supra note 3, at 95.
181. Id. at 94–95.
182. See Hannah Brennan, The Cost of Confusion: The Paradox of Trademarked Pharmaceu-
ticals, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2015).
183. Id. at 29.
184. Id. at 28.
185. Id. at 29.
186. See HEALTHSMART, Generic Versus Brand Medications, http://www.healthsmart.com/
PDFs/Generic-vs-Brand-Name-Drugs.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018) (finding the average price of a 
brand name drug was $137.90, while the average generic prescription cost $35.22).
187. See HEALY, supra note 4, at 14.
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field establish a set of clinical guidelines that tell a doctor at what point she
should prescribe treatment to a patient based on certain test results.188 Drug 
companies exert tremendous influence over the establishment and revision of 
these guidelines.189 As the guidelines for treatment are lowered, patients receive 
earlier and increased pharmaceutical intervention. In 2003, for instance, the Na-
tional Blood Pressure Committee changed the hypertension (i.e., high blood 
pressure) clinical guidelines to include a new category called “prehyperten-
sion,” which required earlier treatment at lower blood pressure levels.190 This 
change created—in an instant—45 million new patients to whom doctors should 
be prescribing once-a-day for-life statin drugs like Lipitor and Crestor.191 No-
body’s health or blood pressure readings changed—the pharmaceutical industry 
simply helped redefine which blood pressure levels require treatment.
The American Heart Association revised the guidelines for high blood pres-
sure again in 2017, which determined that an additional 14% of Americans now 
had high blood pressure and should be receiving treatment.192 Redefining health 
is as simple as saying that while once 140/90 was a normal blood pressure read-
ing, now 120/80 is the new normal reading.193 Unsurprisingly, revised clinical 
guidelines “almost always recommend more treatment for more people.”194 As 
one doctor describes it, drug companies are engaged in a process of “patholo-
gizing huge swathes of daily life” in an effort to “coerce us into treatment for 
conditions we never knew we had, with treatments that in some instances are 
more likely to injure or kill us than improve our well-being.”195
Changes in the laws that govern prescription drug advertising have enabled 
drug companies to persuade people to become patients and to seek out their life-
style drugs. Recall, FDAMA lifted the ban on televised direct-to-consumer 
(“DTC”) prescription drug advertising.196 DTC advertising for prescription 
drugs is an extremely effective strategy for generating customer interest in a 
product. Each dollar the pharmaceutical industry spends on DTC advertising 
results in an additional $4.20 in sales.197 This exceptional return on investment 
results from the fact that when a patient requests a specific drug from her doc-
188. See id. at 136–37.
189. See id. at 129–58.
190. See DUMIT, supra note 3, at 164.
191. Id.
192. Robert M. Carey, et al., High Blood Pressure Redefined for First Time in 14 Years: 130 
Is the New High, AM. HEART ASS’N (Nov. 13, 2007), https://newsroom.heart.org/news/high-blood-
pressure-redefined-for-first-time-in-14-years-130-is-the-new-high.
193. Monique Tello, New High Blood Pressure Guidelines: Think Your Blood Pressure Is 
Fine? Think Again. . ., HAR. HEALTH PUBL’G (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/new-high-blood-pressure-guidelines-2017111712756.
194. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 14.
195. HEALY, supra note 4, at 4, 14.
196. 21 U.S.C.A. § 331 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231); see also Draft Guidance for 
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisments, 62 Fed. Reg. 43171, 43172 (Aug. 12, 1997).
197. Brennan, supra note 182, at 27.
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tor, the doctor prescribes that drug at least 75% of the time.198 This, of course, 
sheds new light on the familiar DTC advertising phrase, “ask your doctor 
about . . . .” And since the average American views 16 hours of televised pre-
scription drug advertisements each year (which is more time than they spend 
annually with their doctor), a patient knows precisely which prescription drugs 
to request.199 Prior to FDAMA, the presumption was that it was too dangerous 
to advertise prescription drugs and commodify sickness, which is why every
other nation in the world prohibits DTC prescription drug advertising (except 
New Zealand, but there by oversight, not design).200
Drug companies justify these ubiquitous DTC advertising campaigns by 
claiming that they only seek to educate consumers about health, not to persuade 
them that they are sick and need to buy medicine.201 Indeed, some of the FDA-
approved DTC advertisements are authorized for “educational purposes” only. 
The FDA authorizes drug companies to air three types of advertisements: prod-
uct claim ads (these inform about a drug’s benefits and risks), reminder ads 
(these name the drug but not the benefits or risks of the drug), and help-seeking 
ads (these “educate” the consumer about disease symptoms and name the drug 
maker, but not the specific drug).202 Of course, such educational claims are dif-
ficult to take seriously, and most medical experts recognize that DTC adver-
tisements seek to “drive consumer demand for . . . drugs far beyond the bulk of 
those patients who really benefit from them.”203 David Vladeck explains the re-
ality of DTC advertising in the following terms:
DTC advertising imperils the health of the American public by offering exaggerat-
ed, incomplete, and deceptive information about drugs. DTC ads are inevitably 
misleading because it is impossible to present accurate and balanced information 
about the benefits and risks of a drug in a commercial that is typically thirty to sixty 
seconds long. Moreover, the proponents would argue, the primary purpose of DTC 
advertising is not to educate consumers, but instead is to encourage them to active-
ly seek out medication that their physician would not otherwise prescribe. The em-
pirical evidence supports that claim.204
198. David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 259, 270 (2007).
199. Id.
200. Amanda L. Connors, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical Analysis of Physician-Directed and 
Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB. L. REV. 243, 267 (2009); Susanna Every-Palmer et 
al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Medication in New Zealand, 127 N.Z. Med. J. 
102, 103 (2014) (for New Zealand oversight).
201. Connors, supra note 200, at 269.
202. Id. at 268.
203. Barry Meier, Med. Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES,
(Dec. 19, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/business/medicine-fueled-by-marketing-
intensified-trouble-for-pain-pills.html.
204. Vladeck, supra note 198, at 276.
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DTC advertising, like all commercial advertising, is aimed at persuading the 
public to buy a product—in this case, that product happens to be a prescription 
drug.
Upon closer examination, the pharmaceutical industry’s claim to be using 
advertising to educate consumers takes on frightening dimensions. It turns out 
that drug companies actually sponsor educational and so-called “awareness”
campaigns to drum up business for their diseases (and, subsequently, treat-
ments) in a marketing tactic called “astroturfing”—the creation of an artificial 
“grassroots” buzz about an issue.205 The American Obesity Association 
(“AOA”) serves as a prime example of drug company astroturfing. Dr. Richard 
Atkinson, an AOA spokesperson, has been quoted saying that it is “time to stop 
thinking of obesity as a problem of willpower, and start thinking of it as a 
chronic disease that requires long-term treatment,” before concluding that “diet, 
exercise, and behavior modification don’t work long term . . . the time has come 
to start thinking about drugs.”206 The AOA would later reveal that it received 
the bulk of its funding from the major drug companies that manufacture and sell 
diet pills.207 When confronted about his role in this astroturfing scheme, Atkin-
son nonchalantly responded that “I think I’ve been pretty honest and uncorrupt-
ed by the money. But who knows, maybe it’s so insidious that I don’t notice 
it.”208 While advertisers politely call this tactic astroturfing, more pointed critics 
of the pharmaceutical industry refer to this behavior as “disease mongering.”209
These critics attribute disease mongering to the rise in “awareness” of dubious 
medical conditions such as osteopenia, fibromyalgia, attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, and restless leg syndrome.210 And awareness of these diseases is 
no laughing matter: experts believe the drug company GlaxoSmithKline will 
surpass $1.2 billion in revenue selling a drug approved to treat restless leg syn-
drome, a disease that may not even exist.211
FDAMA also loosened restrictions on off-label “detailing”—the in-person 
advertising that drug companies engage in behind closed doors with doctors.212
Before these regulatory changes, the FDA strictly prohibited drug companies 
205. DUMIT, supra note 3, at 44.
206. KASSIRER, supra note 135, at 34 (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 35.
209. HEALY, supra note 4, at 38.
210. Id.
211. Jim Edwards, Can Glaxo Make $1.2B Treating a Disease That Doesn’t Exist?, CBS
MONEY WATCH (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:54 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-glaxo-make-12b-
treating-a-disease-that-doesnt-exist.
212. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2008-D-0053, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE 
PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED 
MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2008), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=FDA-2008-D-0053-0002.
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from advertising a prescription drug for a non-FDA approved use.213 This long-
standing prohibition was in place for obvious reasons: if a drug company could 
advertise a drug that has not been approved, why have an FDA approval process 
in the first place? Nonetheless, a drug company may now disseminate peer-
reviewed journal articles about an off-label (unapproved) use of its drug to a 
doctor in an effort to persuade her to prescribe the drug to her patients on an ex-
perimental basis.214 Of course, as the previous section demonstrates, the drug 
companies themselves write the peer-reviewed journal articles that they then 
disseminate as “evidence” to convince the doctors to prescribe the drug off-
label. An industry observer describes the pharmaceutical industry’s approach to 
detailing, noting that:
[The drug companies] sponsor studies to produce evidence supporting off-label us-
es, oversee the publication of study results, purchase reprints of the articles, and 
distribute them to physicians. Typically, these studies produce data that falls woe-
fully short of what the FDA would require to approve the drug for the new use. 
Nevertheless, the articles describing the studies often convince physicians to pre-
scribe the drugs off-label.215
Detailing doctors to prescribe drugs for off-label uses pays off: at least 20% 
of all prescriptions that doctors write are for off-label uses.216 For some patient 
populations, off-label prescriptions make up the bulk of treatment, as 50–75% 
of cancer drugs are prescribed off-label, 80% of drugs prescribed to pediatric 
patients are off-label, and 80–90% of prescriptions for rare diseases are off la-
bel.217 It is estimated that drug companies earn hundreds of billions of dollars 
each year from off-label prescription drug sales.218
The high frequency of off-label prescription writing endangers public health 
because at least 70% of these off-label uses lack significant scientific support 
for the drug’s safety and efficacy.219 Parke-Davis’s off-label detailing campaign 
of the drug Neurontin—which one company employee referred to as the “snake 
oil” of the twentieth century—provides a good example of the dangers detailing 
poses to consumers.220 Nuerontin was approved to treat epilepsy, but Parke-
213. U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BACKGROUNDER ON FDAMA, (Nov. 21, 1997), https://
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/
FDAMA/ucm089179.htm.
214. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2296, § 401 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
215. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 658–59.
216. Greene & Noah, supra note 176, at 241.
217. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 656.
218. Id. at 658. This calculation is based on estimated 2017 global pharmaceutical sales ($1.2 
trillion) multiplied by the percentage of off-label prescription sales (20%). Greene & Noah, supra
note 176, at 241 (detailing the percentage of off-label prescription sales at 20%); Craig W. Lindsley, 
New 2016 Data and Statistics for Global Pharmaceutical Products and Projections through 2017, 8 
ACS CHEM. NEUROSCI. 1635, 1635 (2017).
219. Rodwin, supra note 178, at 656.
220. Greene, supra note 171, at 652.
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Davis detailed doctors to prescribe the drug to treat bipolar disorder, “pain,” and 
migraines, despite the fact that Nuerontin was known to increase the risk of sui-
cide in patients taking the drug.221 The company actively suppressed evidence 
that Nuerontin was not an effective treatment for these off-label uses.222 In just 
one of many off-label detailing campaigns that included 2,700 patients receiv-
ing Nuerontin via off-label prescription, 11 patients died and 73 others suffered 
“severe adverse reactions.”223 Ninety percent of all Nuerontin sales were from 
off-label prescriptions and Parke-Davis made $2.7 billion from Nuerontin sales 
in 2003 alone.224
The federal courts have repeatedly upheld the right to detail as authorized 
commercial speech against FDA attempts to more closely regulate the prac-
tice.225 First, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, the court found that 
the FDA could not restrict truthful off-label detailing to doctors, as the off-label 
speech was protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.226 Again, 
in United States v. Caronia, the court determined that the FDA could not pre-
vent truthful and non-misleading off-label drug promotion of any kind to doc-
tors, as off-label promotion is no different than other forms of protected com-
mercial speech.227 The court reached this holding despite the fact that the drug 
company representative—and defendant—in Caronia told doctors that the drug 
Xyrem was “very safe” with no contraindications despite the fact that it carried 
the FDA’s most serious safety warnings due to its dangerous side effects.228
FDAMA has produced a legal environment that enables drug companies to 
focus on profit through advertising at the expense of safety and innovation. In-
stead of researching new treatments, drug companies seek to create new pa-
tients. Consumers are inundated with DTC advertisements on the internet, on 
television, and in magazines. Meanwhile, doctors prescribe untested drugs to 
patients who are unaware that they are the experimental subjects of off-label 
detailing campaigns. The legal race to the bottom in the pharmaceutical industry 
allows drug companies to invent diseases, raise awareness for these corporate 
constructions, adjust treatment guidelines, and then sell expensive prescription 
drugs that are of little to no medical value to many patients. In other words, the 
“industry has corrupted the system so that, in several ways, the system now 
subverts the public good. Pharmaceutical firms have learned how to make huge 
profits with drugs that do not much improve public health and that sometimes 
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Carl Elliot, Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/opinion/useless-pharmaceutical-studies-real-harm.html.
224. Greene, supra note 171, at 675.
225. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) 
(affirming that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection).
226. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012).
228. Greene, supra note 171, at 675.
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are unsafe or are prescribed without need.”229 And, akin to corporate law’s nine-
teenth-century race to the bottom, this atmosphere of deregulation appears to be 
the product of an intentional blurring of the boundaries between the private and 
the public sectors.
C. Lobbying, the Revolving Door, and Limited Liability
In his canonical analysis of nineteenth-century government regulation, Ga-
briel Kolko observes that federal regulators often cease to function as industry 
policemen and instead come to serve the industry they are supposed to regu-
late.230 The robber barons that spearheaded the race to the bottom “realized that 
they needed the protection of the federal government, and they became the lead-
ing advocates of federal regulation on their own terms.”231 This phenomenon of 
government regulation that serves and enables a particular industry is known as 
“regulatory capture”—the system through which an industry infiltrates and di-
rects the regulatory body that is supposed to control it. Industry leaders were 
able to capture these regulatory bodies because they “thoroughly insinuated 
themselves into the modern state. Through their lobbies and friendships, they 
could be found in Congress, the legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts.”232 In-
dustry insiders blurred the line between the public and private sector by erecting 
a revolving door through which members of the industry routinely joined the 
government and, subsequently, members of the government seamlessly rejoined 
the industry.
This final subsection demonstrates that contemporary pharmaceutical exec-
utives have infiltrated the modern American government and captured the FDA. 
To achieve this outcome, the pharmaceutical industry has spent more on gov-
ernment lobbying than any other industry for nearly twenty years in a row.233 In 
addition, they have established a revolving door between the pharmaceutical 
industry and both the FDA and Congress, such that in any given year more than 
half of the pharmaceutical industry lobbyists are former federal officials.234 This 
political clout has resulted in an industry largely insulated from liability for its 
individual criminal actions. The government routinely avoids holding individual 
pharmaceutical executives accountable for illegal acts of misbranding, fraud,
and bribery. The government instead enters into non-prosecution agreements (or 
deferred prosecution agreements) with corporate subsidiaries, which result in 
229. Jorgensen, supra note 9, at 562.
230. KOLKO, supra note 39, at 168–69.
231. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
232. WHITE, supra note 25, at 511.
233. Dana Taschner, PLIVA Shields Big Pharma from Billions, Cuts Consumers’ Rights, 49 
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inconsequential criminal fines that drug companies write off as just another 
“cost of doing business.”235
From 1998 to 2017 drug companies have spent $3.7 billion on lobbying 
government officials to support industry initiatives.236 This staggering amount 
of money is $1 billion more than the insurance industry, which ranks a distant 
second in special interest spending over the same time period.237 Indeed, the 
pharmaceutical industry has ranked first in lobbying expenditures every year 
since 1999.238 In 2009 alone, drug companies spent $272 million on govern-
ment lobbying, a sum that still stands “as the greatest amount ever spent on lob-
bying efforts by a single industry for one year.”239 It should come as little sur-
prise that Congress enacted FDAMA (discussed at length above), which legal-
legalized DTC advertising, off-label detailing, and provided for streamlined 
FDA approval, “following intense lobbying” by the pharmaceutical industry.240
FDAMA—itself the product of special interest influence—produced addi-
tional levels of industry influence through its reauthorization of the Prescription 
Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (“PDUFA”).241 PDUFA requires drug companies to 
pay a fee to the FDA to review and approve the drug company’s new drug ap-
plication; these “user fees” pay for about 65% of the costs that the FDA incurs 
during the review and approval process.242 Although superficially these fees ap-
pear to penalize the drug companies, in actual practice the user fees have:
changed the entire culture at the FDA as well as its relationships with the pharma-
ceutical companies and the American people. The FDA used to have one client: the 
American people. The fact that the companies it regulates pay user-fees for the ser-
vice has meant that the only clients on the FDA’s case are drug company represent-
atives. This is so even though the speeded up process results in profits that vastly 
exceed the fees, and even though the actual contribution of industry to the finances 
of the FDA is a fraction of that provided by public monies. The FDA now behaves 
as if the manufacturers are the only clients worth serving.243
In essence, drug companies lobbied the government to enact a law that not only 
permits but also legally requires drug companies to finance the one agency that 
235. See Greene, supra note 171, at 653.
236. OPENSECRETS.ORG: CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
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regulates them. This, to put it mildly, creates a host of potential conflicts of in-
terest.244
In addition to their lobbying efforts, drug companies have facilitated a re-
volving door between the federal government and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Industry observers have identified an uptick in the speed of the revolving door 
beginning in 2001, when President George W. Bush appointed Daniel Troy as
the FDA’s Chief Counsel.245 Incidentally, this revolving door arose contempo-
raneously with the pharmaceutical industry’s rise to the top of the list of gov-
ernment lobbyists.246 Before his appointment as Chief Counsel, Troy was a 
partner at Wiley, Rein & Fielding (and later at Sidley Austin LLP), where he 
“represented pharmaceutical companies and trade associations relating to US 
FDA and government regulations.”247 In fact, Troy represented the Washington 
Legal Foundation on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry in the aforemen-
tioned Washington Legal Foundation v. Heeney, the controversial case that es-
tablished drug company off-label detailing as protected commercial speech.248
In a very real sense, Troy went from representing the pharmaceutical industry 
against the FDA to regulating his former clients from within the FDA. Shortly 
after Troy’s appointment as Chief Counsel, the number of FDA warning letters 
censuring drug companies dropped by half and the time it took to issue a warn-
ing letter jumped from two weeks to four months.249 It was Troy’s job to review 
and issue FDA warning letters.250 After resigning as Chief Counsel of the FDA, 
Troy joined the drug company GlaxoSmithKline where he served for nearly a 
decade as General Counsel and Senior Vice President.251
The current FDA Commissioner is Scott Gottlieb.252 In addition to having 
served on the advisory board or board of directors of six drug companies, 
Gottlieb has “received some $413,700 from drug companies for consulting, 
speaking or other services. In 2015 alone, he collected $199,951 from eight 
drug companies, including GlaxoSmithKline, Squibb, Pfizer, and Valeant. All 
are likely to have regulatory business with the FDA in coming years.”253
Gottlieb’s predecessor as FDA Commissioner, a President Obama appointee, 
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was Robert Califf.254 Prior to joining the FDA, Califf disclosed that the drug 
companies Merck, Novartis, and Eli Lilly supported his salary at Duke Univer-
sity.255 Harvard professor Daniel Carpenter called Califf “the ultimate industry 
insider.”256 After resigning as FDA Commissioner, Califf joined the scientific 
board at Verily Life Sciences,257 a company that has close partnerships with 
GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Pharmaceutical, Biogen Pharmaceutical, and Johnson 
& Johnson.258 Compounding this revolving door problem at the FDA’s highest 
levels is a recent study finding that, at a minimum, 27% of FDA employees 
leave the agency to work with or consult for the pharmaceutical industry.259 The 
primary issue with these sorts of revolving door relationships is that “if you 
know in the back of your mind that a major career opportunity after the FDA is 
going to work on the other side of the table,” it can make these regulators “less 
likely to put [their] foot down.”260 Indeed, recent history has shown ample evi-
dence confirming the frequency of this flight from the FDA to industry. As Fran 
Hawthrone notes:
With the FDA’s relatively low salaries and generous retirement incentives, many 
reviewers leave after 20 years, and the obvious move is to work at or consult to a 
big drug company. This is what Tom Garvey did in setting up his own consulting 
firm, and Susan Alpert did in going to Medtronic. So did Steve Koepke and Stuart 
Portnoy, who joined the contract research organization PharmaNet. Jay Siegel now 
runs research and development at Centocor, after leaving the Center for Biologics. 
Michael Friedman, the acting commissioner during the tumult of the late 1990s, 
became a senior-level executive at G.D. Searle & Company, then at Pharmacia 
Corporation when the latter bought Searle’s parent Monsanto Company in 2000. 
He also did special work on preparedness at PhRMA, the industry trade group.261
The additional fact that 66% (926 of 1403) of pharmaceutical industry lobbyists 
were once federal officials highlights just how blurred the lines between gov-
ernment and industry have become.262
As lobbying reinforces the pharmaceutical industry’s political clout and the 
revolving door blurs the line between government and industry, drug company 
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executives appear to be escaping liability for their criminal conduct. The prima-
ry legal devices that enable corporate executives to avoid criminal liability are 
the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) and the non-prosecution agree-
ment (“NPA”).263 Under a DPA, the “prosecutor and the corporation agree that 
although the prosecutor will charge the corporation in federal court, the prose-
cutor will defer the continued prosecution of the charges until the end of a cer-
tain period of time agreed upon by both parties. If, at the end of the term of the 
agreement, the corporation has followed through on its obligations, the prosecu-
tor will dismiss the charges.”264 NPAs work in a similar fashion, with the ex-
ception that under an NPA the government never even files criminal charges in 
federal court; they only threaten to do so if the corporation does not comply 
with the terms of the agreement.265 Normally, the corporation pays a large crim-
inal fine to the government and must agree to a number of compliance reforms 
that are aimed at preventing similar incidents of criminal behavior in the fu-
ture.266 According to Brandon Garrett, the government relies on DPAs and 
NPAs in prosecuting corporate malfeasance because prosecutors lack certainty 
that they can secure convictions of individuals as a result of the “organization 
complexity” of corporate decision making.267 Another theory is that the gov-
ernment conducts a simple cost-benefit analysis: the government achieves the 
same results (corporate cooperation, fines, admissions, and reform) at a fraction 
of the cost of going to trial.268
Legal scholars have also raised more cynical explanations for the govern-
ment’s use of DPAs and NPAs to address corporate crime: corruption resulting 
from lobbying and the revolving door between the public and private sector.269
The use of DPAs to settle corporate criminal trials emerged as the government’s 
primary tactic in 2001 during the Bush administration, which some view as “the 
predictable response of a business-friendly administration to increased corpo-
rate crime.”270 Indeed, the government entered only 9 DPAs with corporations 
in the decade before 2001, while they entered into 39 DPAs in the subsequent 
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five years.271 The government entered into 17 DPAs to settle corporate crimes 
in 2017 alone.272 The empirical evidence supports the finding that the govern-
ment tends to enter DPAs with large, publicly traded corporations that have 
high annual earnings (and, presumably, greater lobbying capacity).273 Whatever 
the underlying intent, DPAs certainly create the appearance that “large compa-
nies can buy their way out of criminal prosecution.”274 As the next section ex-
plains, this erosion of corporate liability has contributed to the ascendance of 
the pharma barons.
III. THE RISE OF THE PHARMA BARONS
Just as corporate law’s nineteenth-century race to the bottom enabled the 
rise of the robber barons, the current legal and regulatory race to the bottom in 
the pharmaceutical industry has elevated some drug company executives to the 
status of what I call the “pharma barons.” As this section argues, executives and 
controlling stockholders at Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, and Purdue Pharmaceuti-
cals steered their respective companies through the development and marketing 
of drugs that have collectively killed hundreds of thousands of people. Execu-
tives and researchers from these three companies exploited clinical trials, evi-
dence-based medicine, clinical guidelines, DTC advertising, and off-label de-
tailing in the development and marketing of drugs that they knew had efficacy 
issues and deadly side effects.  No executives from these companies have gone 
to prison or faced meaningful liability for their actions. Instead, Merck, Glax-
oSmithKline, and Purdue have entered into DPAs and NPAs with the govern-
ment and paid hefty fines to settle criminal charges of fraud, misbranding, and 
bribery. Where once there was a Gilded Age, America is now in the throes of 
the Prescription Age. The pharma barons, unfortunately, are proving far more 
dangerous to the American public than the robber barons ever were.
The FDA approved Merck’s COX-2 inhibiting painkiller Vioxx in 1999.275
Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market in 2004 due to fatal side 
effects relating to heart attack and stroke.276 The FDA concluded that in the five 
years Vioxx was on the market, it was responsible for at least 60,000 deaths.277
The entire Vietnam War, for the sake of comparison, resulted in 58,200 U.S. 
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causalities.278 Other estimates suggest that Vioxx’s adverse side effects may 
have killed as many as 500,000 people.279 To provide additional scale, World 
War II caused 418,500 U.S. causalities.280
The story of Vioxx serves as a microcosm of the pharmaceutical industry’s
legal race to the bottom. First, Merck conducted clinical trials to test Vioxx un-
der the regime of “evidence based medicine” that the Kefauver-Harris Amend-
ments initiated.281 Merck’s researchers and executives became aware of the 
deadly cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx during a phase 2 trial in 
1996.282 In 1998, the clinical trial “Study 090” determined that serious cardio-
vascular side effects “occurred almost six times more often in patients taking 
Vioxx than in patients taking another arthritis drug or placebo.”283 Despite this 
evidence (or, perhaps, because of this evidence) Merck proceeded to engage in 
both clinical and publication bias to create deceptive evidentiary support for Vi-
oxx’s efficacy and safety. The company ghostwrote articles that appeared in 
leading medical journals and quickly it “became clear that in every case the au-
thors [of the journal articles] either could not take full responsibility for their 
trials, or there were distortions of the evidence that seriously weakened the con-
clusions of the trials that such drugs did not cause cardiovascular disease.”284 In 
other words, Merck doctored the clinical trial outcomes.
After securing FDA approval based on the biased evidence from these clini-
cal trials, Merck began an aggressive advertising campaign for Vioxx, spending 
$161 million in DTC advertising in 2000 alone.285 Merck’s successful DTC ad 
campaign starring figure skater Dorothy Hamill has since been pilloried for 
turning “hope into hype” and pushing the use of Vioxx “well beyond what 
could be justified medically.”286 Merck representatives also conducted in-person 
detailing of doctors armed with the “Cardiovascular Card”—a piece of promo-
tional material Merck prepared to reassure doctors that Vioxx was protecting
the heart, not harming it.287 For obvious liability reasons, Merck instructed its 
sales representatives to never leave the Cardiovascular Card behind with physi-
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cians after detailing them.288 In 2000, Merck conducted another Vioxx clinical 
trial in the hopes of gaining more far-reaching FDA approvals to grow the 
drug’s market size. The now infamous “VIGOR Study (Vioxx Gastrointestinal 
Outcomes Research)” returned similarly damning results with regard to cardio-
vascular risk.289 CEO Raymond Gilmartin was present at the board meeting 
when company officials reported these results to top executives.290
Merck feared that public knowledge of the Vioxx cardiovascular risks 
would reduce sales by at least 50%.291 To allay growing concerns about Vioxx’s 
safety profile, Merck issued a press release titled “Merck Confirms Favorable 
Cardiovascular Safety Profile of Vioxx.”292 In response, the FDA issued a 
warning letter calling Merck’s misleading claims “simply incomprehensible.”293
Contemporaneously, President Bush was attempting to appoint Merck executive 
Eve Slater as the new FDA Commissioner; however, Congress rejected the ap-
pointment due to concerns about Slater’s status as a pharmaceutical industry in-
sider (concerns, it seems, that no longer appear to trouble Congress).294 Instead, 
President Bush appointed Slater as the Assistant Secretary of Health at the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, which conveniently oversees the 
FDA.295 Merck never received another FDA warning letter related to Vioxx.296
After Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx from the market, the Department 
of Justice charged Merck with the crimes of introducing a misbranded drug into 
interstate commerce, conducting illegal off-label promotion, and making false 
statements about “Vioxx’s cardiovascular safety in order to increase sales of the 
drug.”297 Merck entered into an NPA with the government and one of its subsid-
iaries agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor charge of illegal promotional 
activity and to pay a fine of $950 million.298 Importantly, it was Merck’s sub-
sidiary that entered the agreement—not Merck. If Merck had been convicted of 
this crime, it could no longer participate in the highly lucrative state and federal 
Medicare and Medicaid programs through which drug companies earn vast rev-
enue streams.299 All told, Merck made $11 billion from sales of Vioxx, a sum 
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which greatly exceeds the criminal and civil fines it paid in connection with il-
legally marketing the drug.300 The government did not charge any Merck execu-
tives or employees with a crime.301 After receiving his nearly $40 million com-
pensation package, Merck CEO Raymond Gilmartin moved on to a teaching 
position at Harvard Business School.302 While at Harvard, Gilmartin wrote a
piece encouraging CEOs to prioritize social responsibility over profit as he 
claimed he had done as Merck’s CEO—Gilmartin, notably, makes no mention 
of Vioxx in his article.303
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) engaged in nearly identical behavior in its de-
velopment and marketing of Paxil, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibiting 
(“SSRI”) antidepressant drug. The FDA had approved Paxil for treatment of 
adults with social anxiety disorder, major panic disorder, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder.304 In securing these approvals, GSK 
engaged in both clinical bias and publication bias. GSK had to conduct 16 clini-
cal trials before it secured the 2 positive results it needed for FDA approval.305
An independent review of GSK’s clinical trial data “suggested that at least 75% 
of the benefit supposedly due to the antidepressants was also seen in the placebo 
group.”306 In addition to hiding these failed clinical trials from the FDA, GSK 
concealed information that Paxil greatly increased the frequency of suicidal be-
havior in adolescents.307 During clinical trials, GSK went so far as to move hu-
man subjects who committed suicidal acts into the placebo group in an attempt 
to skew the evidence in its favor.308 Indeed, the clinical trial data revealed that 
an adolescent taking Paxil was nearly 3 times more likely to become suicidal 
than an adolescent taking a placebo.309 Despite this knowledge, GSK actively 
engaged in an off-label detailing campaign to encourage doctors to prescribe 
Paxil to children suffering from depression.310 GSK even engaged in a scheme 
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of bribery and kickbacks to entice doctors to write off-label prescriptions of the 
drug specifically to treat children.311 Executives sent a memo to sales represent-
atives informing them that “Paxil demonstrates REMARKABLE Efficacy and 
Safety in the treatment of adolescent depression,” and encouraged them to con-
vey this information to doctors.312 Thousands of children and teens ultimately 
committed suicide while on Paxil.313
In connection with its deadly fraud related to Paxil and other drugs, GSK 
settled criminal charges with the government and paid a $3 billion fine for in-
troducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce.314 GSK has earned an 
estimated $11.6 billion in Paxil sales.315 GSK and the government also entered 
into an NPA that protected the drug company from additional criminal liability 
related to its illegal conduct.316 No GSK executives were charged with a 
crime.317 J.P. Garnier, CEO of GSK at the time of the Paxil criminal investiga-
tion, likened government probes into GSK’s misrepresentations as “extortion”
and a legal system “out of control.”318 In 2007, he earned $9.4 million in his fi-
nal year as CEO of GSK.319 In the same year that GSK settled criminal charges 
with the government, it paid its new CEO Andrew Witty the equivalent of $14 
million in executive compensation.320 Despite the fact that these criminal set-
tlements related to the company’s profiteering via adolescent suicide, the British 
government knighted GSK’s CEO for his “services to the economy and the UK 
pharmaceutical industry.”321 If not a pharma baron, Witty has—quite literally—
attained the status of a “pharma knight.”
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Purdue Pharmaceutical is the drug company that develops and markets the 
opioid painkiller OxyContin.322 OxyContin, due to its patented time-release 
formula, contains a larger dose of the highly addictive oxycodone (a semisyn-
thetic opioid) than other opioid painkillers.323 Purdue began marketing OxyCon-
tin in 1996, and by 2009 doctors were writing 6 million OxyContin prescrip-
tions a year.324 This is a staggering number of prescriptions considering that 
Purdue and other opioid manufacturers have yet to conduct “high-quality, long-
term clinical trials demonstrating the safety and efficacy for [opioids] for chron-
ic non-cancer pain.”325 Indeed, even for short-term pain the evidence for estab-
lishing the efficacy for opioids is “weak and of generally low-quality, particu-
larly compared with other therapies.”326 Instead, drug companies that 
manufacture opioid painkillers rely on clinical trials that use enriched enroll-
ment protocols to secure FDA approval.327 They are forced to rely on enriched 
enrollment protocols because opioids simply do not work for the long-term 
treatment of chronic pain.328 In fact, in a tragic irony, one of the primary risks of 
opioid use to manage chronic pain is increased pain stemming from a phenom-
enon called “opioid induced hyperalgesia.”329 In securing FDA approval, Pur-
due has recognized the pivotal role industry lobbying played in bringing about 
the enriched enrollment protocols.330 Like Merck and GSK, Purdue also em-
ployed a ghostwriting campaign to produce false and misleading evidence of 
OxyContin’s safety and efficacy.331
Purdue’s most successful exploitation of the pharmaceutical industry’s race 
to the bottom was the company’s manipulation of clinical guidelines and its na-
tionwide astroturfing campaign to raise “pain awareness” in the service of Ox-
yContin sales. In the early 1990s, Purdue began an aggressive pain awareness 
initiative whereby:
Purdue provided financial support to the American Pain Society, the American 
Academy of Pain Medicine, the Federation of State Medical Boards, the Joint 
Commission, pain patient groups, and other organizations. In turn, these groups all 
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advocated for more aggressive identification and treatment of pain, especially use 
of [opioid pain relievers]. For example, in 1995, the president of the American Pain 
Society introduced a campaign entitled “Pain is the Fifth Vital Sign” at the socie-
ty’s annual meeting. This campaign encouraged health care professionals to assess 
pain with the “same zeal” as they do with vital signs and urged more aggressive use 
of opioids for chronic non-cancer pain.332
Doctors cannot objectively measure “pain” like the four other vital signs 
(i.e., body temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, and blood pressure). As 
such, doctors must rely on the patient’s assessment of pain levels in determining 
whether or not to provide opioid treatment.333 Patients can sue doctors for not 
properly addressing their pain—this new vital sign.334 Given that up to 12% of 
patients who receive chronic opioid treatments become addicted to opioids, al-
lowing patients to subjectively measure the “fifth vital sign” poses obvious dan-
gers regarding drug dependency outcomes.335 The sobering fact that four out of 
five new heroin users became addicted from using prescription opioids demon-
strates the reality of this danger.336 Nevertheless, in raising awareness of pain as 
the fifth vital sign, Purdue sponsored 40 pain management conferences in a 
five-year period where “more than 5,000 physicians, pharmacists, and nurses 
attended these all-expense-paid symposia.”337 Purdue also used a “patient starter 
coupon program,” through which they provided patients with a free 30-day sup-
ply of the highly addictive OxyContin.338
Purdue’s awareness campaign was successful from a business perspective, 
as doctors wrote ten times as many OxyContin prescriptions in 2001 than they 
did in 1997.339 Purdue has generated an estimated $35 billion in sales since the 
release of OxyContin.340 In 2007, Purdue Frederick Company Inc., an affiliate 
of Purdue (not Purdue itself—for the same reasons that Merck settled through a 
subsidiary), pled guilty to “misbranding OxyContin by claiming that it was less 
addictive and less subject to abuse and diversion than other opioids” and agreed 
to pay $634 million in criminal and civil fines.341 Purdue entered into an NPA 
with the government, forestalling any additional criminal charges in connection 
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with its criminal conduct at issue in the case.342 Three company executives were 
also charged with crimes, but all three settled the charges by paying criminal 
fines of $5,000, respectively.343 Pursuant to an indemnification agreement, Pur-
due paid the fines on behalf of its executives.344 Not mentioned in the criminal 
charges or plea agreement are members of the Sackler family who own and con-
trol Purdue345 and who have an estimated cumulative net worth of $13 billion, 
the bulk of which has been derived through OxyContin sales.346 Experts have 
attributed the “lion’s share” of the prescription opioid crisis to Purdue’s market-
ing of OxyContin.347 Purdue has recently suggested that they will cease adver-
tising OxyContin directly to doctors, but industry observers suggest that this 
public-relations gesture will do little, if anything, to curb the prescription opioid 
crisis.348 The ongoing prescription opioid crisis has killed hundreds of thou-
sands of people, with nearly 20,000 Americans dying from prescription opioid 
overdoses each year.349 As of 2016, the Sacklers were ranked as the nineteenth 
richest family in America.350
CONCLUSION
A group of respected legal scholars have rebranded corporate law’s race to 
the bottom as a “race to the top,” whereby the competition between states for 
corporate charters tended toward “optimal legal systems regulating the market 
for capital.”351 That is, state competition for corporate charters culled away out-
dated and unnecessary regulations and paved the way for an era of unrivaled 
economic growth and efficiency. Indeed, financiers like Gould, Carnegie, and 
Morgan produced the steel, laid the tracks for, and helped finance the transcon-
tinental railroad that ushered in the era of American economic dominance on a 
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global scale.352 Regardless of one’s ideological viewpoint concerning modern 
corporate capitalism, it is undeniable that the race to the bottom made possible 
vertically integrated consolidation companies and new economies of scale that 
have benefited the nation in one form or another.353 That is to say, it is not un-
reasonable to make the argument that the nineteenth-century race to the bottom 
was (at least in part) a race to the top, in that it produced efficiency, innovation, 
and new luxuries available in mass markets.
The same cannot be said for the pharmaceutical industry’s contemporary 
race to the bottom.354 In addition to the widespread and deadly side effects de-
scribed in detail throughout this Article, there is a growing scholarly consensus 
that drug companies have ceased to innovate and now only imitate.355 The per-
verse result of corporate law’s contemporary race to the bottom is that drug 
companies are now incentivized to produce “the most minimally effective, the 
most ineffective effective drug.”356 If a drug company can eke out two clinical 
trials that “prove” that a “new” allergy medicine (a “me-too” molecular 
knockoff of an existing treatment) out-performs the current treatment (through 
hobbled and biased trials), they now have a patented drug to advertise to a pre-
existing, mass market of individuals who they hope will take their drug every 
day for the rest of their lives. As patients, we have to hope that the drug compa-
ny has not buried a host of failed trials that reveal adverse side effects relating 
to heart attacks, suicidal thoughts, or a high possibility of subsequent heroin ad-
diction. If nothing else, awareness of the pharma barons might cause some pa-
tients to think twice the next time a doctor prescribes them a once-a-day drug 
for the rest of their lives to treat “risk factors” for a “disease” that appears to 
have no symptoms.
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